The argument, drawn from the courts of law, applying the principles
of law to new cases as they emerge, is altogether frivolous,
inapplicable, and arises from a total ignorance of the bounds
between civil and criminal jurisdiction, and of the separate maxims
that govern these two provinces of law, that are eternally separate.
Undoubtedly the courts of law, where a new case comes before them,
as they do every hour, then, that there may be no defect in justice,
call in similar principles, and the example of the nearest
determination, and do everything to draw the law to as near a
conformity to general equity and right reason as they can bring it
with its being a fixed principle. Boni judicis est ampliare
justitiam--that is, to make open and liberal justice. But in
criminal matters this parity of reason, and these analogies, ever
have been, and ever ought to be, shunned.

Whatever is incident to a court of judicature, is necessary to the
House of Commons, as judging in elections. But a power of making
incapacities is not necessary to a court of judicature; therefore a
power of making incapacities is not necessary to the House of
Commons.

Incapacity, declared by whatever authority, stands upon two
principles: first, an incapacity arising from the supposed
incongruity of two duties in the commonwealth; secondly, an
incapacity arising from unfitness by infirmity of nature, or the
criminality of conduct. As to the first class of incapacities, they
have no hardship annexed to them. The persons so incapacitated are
paid by one dignity for what they abandon in another, and, for the
most part, the situation arises from their own choice. But as to