the effects of it, than by the method of suffrage in any democratic
State whatsoever. It had always, until of late, been held the first
duty of Parliament TO REFUSE TO SUPPORT GOVERNMENT, UNTIL POWER WAS
IN THE HANDS OF PERSONS WHO WERE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PEOPLE, OR WHILE
FACTIONS PREDOMINATED IN THE COURT IN WHICH THE NATION HAD NO
CONFIDENCE. Thus all the good effects of popular election were
supposed to be secured to us, without the mischiefs attending on
perpetual intrigue, and a distinct canvass for every particular
office throughout the body of the people. This was the most noble
and refined part of our constitution. The people, by their
representatives and grandees, were intrusted with a deliberative
power in making laws; the King with the control of his negative.
The King was intrusted with the deliberative choice and the election
to office; the people had the negative in a Parliamentary refusal to
support. Formerly this power of control was what kept Ministers in
awe of Parliaments, and Parliaments in reverence with the people.
If the use of this power of control on the system and persons of
Administration is gone, everything is lost, Parliament and all. We
may assure ourselves, that if Parliament will tamely see evil men
take possession of all the strongholds of their country, and allow
them time and means to fortify themselves, under a pretence of
giving them a fair trial, and upon a hope of discovering, whether
they will not be reformed by power, and whether their measures will
not be better than their morals; such a Parliament will give
countenance to their measures also, whatever that Parliament may
pretend, and whatever those measures may be.

Every good political institution must have a preventive operation as
well as a remedial. It ought to have a natural tendency to exclude
bad men from Government, and not to trust for the safety of the