kindness, and even of public spirit. He can procure indemnity from
quarters. He can procure advantages in trade. He can get pardons
for offences. He can obtain a thousand favours, and avert a
thousand evils. He may, while he betrays every valuable interest of
the kingdom, be a benefactor, a patron, a father, a guardian angel,
to his borough. The unfortunate independent member has nothing to
offer, but harsh refusal, or pitiful excuse, or despondent
representation of a hopeless interest. Except from his private
fortune, in which he may be equalled, perhaps exceeded, by his Court
competitor, he has no way of showing any one good quality, or of
making a single friend. In the House, he votes for ever in a
dispirited minority. If he speaks, the doors are locked. A body of
loquacious placemen go out to tell the world, that all he aims at,
is to get into office. If he has not the talent of elocution, which
is the case of many as wise and knowing men as any in the House, he
is liable to all these inconveniences, without the eclat which
attends upon any tolerably successful exertion of eloquence. Can we
conceive a more discouraging post of duty than this? Strip it of
the poor reward of popularity; suffer even the excesses committed in
defence of the popular interest to become a ground for the majority
of that House to form a disqualification out of the line of the law,
and at their pleasure, attended not only with the loss of the
franchise, but with every kind of personal disgrace; if this shall
happen, the people of this kingdom may be assured that they cannot
be firmly or faithfully served by any man. It is out of the nature
of men and things that they should; and their presumption will be
equal to their folly, if they expect it. The power of the people,
within the laws, must show itself sufficient to protect every
representative in the animated performance of his duty, or that duty
cannot be performed. The House of Commons can never be a control on