to render such contentions, foot frequently repeated, utterly
ruinous, first to independence of fortune, and then to independence
of spirit. As I am only giving an opinion on this point, and not at
all debating it in an adverse line, I hope I may be excused in
another observation. With great truth I may aver that I never
remember to have talked on this subject with any man much conversant
with public business who considered short Parliaments as a real
improvement of the Constitution. Gentlemen, warm in a popular
cause, are ready enough to attribute all the declarations of such
persons to corrupt motives. But the habit of affairs, if, on one
hand, it tends to corrupt the mind, furnishes it, on the other, with
the, means of better information. The authority of such persons
will always have some weight. It may stand upon a par with the
speculations of those who are less practised in business; and who,
with perhaps purer intentions, have not so effectual means of
judging. It is besides an effect of vulgar and puerile malignity to
imagine that every Statesman is of course corrupt: and that his
opinion, upon every constitutional point, is solely formed upon some
sinister interest.

The next favourite remedy is a Place-bill. The same principle
guides in both: I mean the opinion which is entertained by many of
the infallibility of laws and regulations, in the cure of public
distempers. Without being as unreasonably doubtful as many are
unwisely confident, I will only say, that this also is a matter very
well worthy of serious and mature reflection. It is not easy to
foresee what the effect would be of disconnecting with Parliament,
the greatest part of those who hold civil employments, and of such
mighty and important bodies as the military and naval
establishments. It were better, perhaps, that they should have a