The common saying, that tastes are not to be disputed, owes its
influence, and its general reception, to the same error which leads us to
imagine it of too high original to submit to the authority of an earthly
tribunal. It will likewise correspond with the notions of those who
consider it as a mere phantom of the imagination, so devoid of substance
as to elude all criticism.

We often appear to differ in sentiments from each other, merely from the
inaccuracy of terms, as we are not obliged to speak always with critical
exactness. Something of this too may arise from want of words in the
language to express the more nice discriminations which a deep
investigation discovers. A great deal, however, of this difference
vanishes when each opinion is tolerably explained and understood by
constancy and precision in the use of terms.

We apply the term taste to that act of the mind by which we like or
dislike, whatever be the subject. Our judgment upon an airy nothing, a
fancy which has no foundation, is called by the same name which we give
to our determination concerning those truths which refer to the most
general and most unalterable principles of human nature, to works which
are only to be produced by the greatest efforts of the human
understanding. However inconvenient this may be, we are obliged to take
words as we find them; all we can do is to distinguish the things to
which they are applied.

We may let pass those things which are at once subjects of taste and
sense, and which having as much certainty as the senses themselves, give
no occasion to inquiry or dispute. The natural appetite or taste of the
human mind is for truth; whether that truth results from the real
agreement or equality of original ideas among themselves; from the