surely very irrational. The rules of evidence no more depend on
the magnitude of the interests at stake than the rules of
arithmetic. We might as well say that we have a greater chance
of throwing a size when we are playing for a penny than when we
are playing for a thousand pounds, as that a form of trial which
is sufficient for the purposes of justice, in a matter affecting
liberty and property, is insufficient in a matter affecting life.
Nay, if a mode of proceeding be too lax for capital cases, it is,
a fortiori, too lax for all others; for in capital cases, the
principles of human nature will always afford considerable
security. No judge is so cruel as he who indemnifies himself
for scrupulosity in cases of blood, by licence in affairs of
smaller importance. The difference in tale on the one side far
more than makes up for the difference in weight on the other.

If there be any universal objection to retrospective punishment,
there is no more to be said. But such is not the opinion of Mr.
Hallam. He approves of the mode of proceeding. He thinks that a
punishment, not previously affixed by law to the offences of
Strafford, should have been inflicted; that Strafford should have
been, by act of Parliament, degraded from his rank, and condemned
to perpetual banishment. Our difficulty would have been at the
first step, and there only. Indeed we can scarcely conceive that
any case which does not call for capital punishment can call for
punishment by a retrospective act. We can scarcely conceive a man
so wicked and so dangerous that the whole course of law must be
disturbed in order to reach him, yet not so wicked as to deserve
the severest sentence, nor so dangerous as to require the last
and surest custody, that of the grave. If we had thought that
Strafford might be safely suffered to live in France, we should