Hume and many other writers have hastily concluded, that, in the
fifteenth century, the English Parliament was altogether servile,
because it recognised, without opposition, every successful
usurper. That it was not servile its conduct on many occasions of
inferior importance is sufficient to prove. But surely it was not
strange that the majority of the nobles, and of the deputies
chosen by the commons, should approve of revolutions which the
nobles and commons had effected. The Parliament did not blindly
follow the event of war, but participated in those changes of
public sentiment on which the event of war depended. The legal
check was secondary and auxiliary to that which the nation held
in its own hands.

There have always been monarchies in Asia, in which the royal
authority has been tempered by fundamental laws, though no
legislative body exists to watch over them. The guarantee is the
opinion of a community of which every individual is a soldier.
Thus, the king of Cabul, as Mr. Elphinstone informs us, cannot
augment the land revenue, or interfere with the jurisdiction of
the ordinary tribunals.

In the European kingdoms of this description there were
representative assemblies. But it was not necessary that those
assemblies should meet very frequently, that they should
interfere with all the operations of the executive government,
that they should watch with jealousy, and resent with prompt
indignation, every violation of the laws which the sovereign
might commit. They were so strong that they might safely be
careless. He was so feeble that he might safely be suffered to
encroach. If he ventured too far, chastisement and ruin were at