even Pym, all the most eminent men in short, Hampden excepted,
were inclined to half measures. They dreaded a decisive victory
almost as much as a decisive overthrow. They wished to bring the
King into a situation which might render it necessary for him to
grant their just and wise demands, but not to subvert the
constitution or to change the dynasty. They were afraid of
serving the purposes of those fierce and determined enemies of
monarchy, who now began to show themselves in the lower ranks of
the party. The war was, therefore, conducted in a languid and
inefficient manner. A resolute leader might have brought it to a
close in a month. At the end of three campaigns, however, the
event was still dubious; and that it had not been decidedly
unfavourable to the cause of liberty was principally owing to the
skill and energy which the more violent roundheads had displayed
in subordinate situations. The conduct of Fairfax and Cromwell at
Marston had, exhibited a remarkable contrast to that of Essex at
Edgehill, and to that of Waller at Lansdowne.

If there be any truth established by the universal experience of
nations, it is this; that to carry the spirit of peace into war
is weak and cruel policy. The time for negotiation is the time
for deliberation and delay. But when an extreme case calls for
that remedy which is in its own nature most violent, and which,
in such cases, is a remedy only because it is violent, it is idle
to think of mitigating and diluting. Languid war can do nothing
which negotiation or submission will not do better: and to act on
any other principle is, not to save blood and money, but to
squander them.

This the parliamentary leaders found. The third year of