financial reasons, and partly on account of the enormous loss of
life among the diggers from the pestilent nature of the climate
and the country. Then followed a period of waiting, until it
seemed certain that the French would never resume operations.
American promoters pressed the claims of a route through
Nicaragua where they could secure concessions. But it became
clear that an enterprise of such far reaching political
importance as a trans-Isthmian canal, should be under
governmental control. John Hay had been less than a year in the
Department of State when he set about negotiating with England a
treaty which should embody his ideas. In Sir Julian Pauncefote,
the British Ambassador at Washington, he had a most congenial man
to deal with. Both were gentlemen, both were firmly convinced
that a canal must be constructed for the good of civilization,
both held that to assure the friendship of the two great branches
of the English-speaking race should be the transcendent aim of
each. They soon made a draft of a treaty which was submitted to
the Senate,,but the Senators so amended it that the British
Government refused to accept their amendments, and the project
failed. Hay was so terribly chagrined at the Senate's
interference that he wished to resign. There could be no doubt
now, however, that if the canal had been undertaken on the terms
of his first treaty, it would never have satisfied the United
States and it would probably have been a continual source of
international irritation. Roosevelt was at that time Governor of
New York, and I quote the following letter from him to Hay
because it shows how clearly he saw the objections to the treaty,
and the fundamental principles for the control of an Isthmian
canal: