fighting than to starve to death, after watching their wives and
children perish. These threats of revolt were made more serious by
the fact that if they were carried out, the English by sea and the
Austrians by land would have rushed to join their efforts to those of
the insurgents, and would have overwhelmed us.

Amid such dangers and calamities of all sorts, Masséna remained
immovable and calm, and to prevent any attempt at an uprising, he
issued a proclamation that French troops had orders to open fire on
any gathering of more than four people. Regiments camped in the
squares and the principal streets. The avenues were occupied by
cannon loaded with grape-shot. It being impossible for them to come
together, the Genoese were unable to revolt.

It may seem surprising that Masséna was so determined to hold on
to a place where he could not feed the inhabitants and could scarcely
maintain his own troops; but Genoa was, at that time, of great
importance. Our army had been cut in two. The centre and the left
wing had retired behind the Var. As long as Masséna occupied Genoa,
he kept part of the Austrian army occupied in besieging him and
prevented them from employing all their forces against Provence.

Masséna knew also that the First Consul was assembling at Dijon,
Lyon, and Geneva, an army of reserve, with which he proposed to cross
the Alps by the St. Bernard pass, to enter Italy and to surprise the
Austrians by falling on their rear while they were directing their
efforts at taking Genoa. We therefore had the greatest interest in
holding the town for as long as possible. These were the orders of
the First Consul, and were subsequently justified by events.