that we apply quantitative terms to other things. We speak of
what is white as large, because the surface over which the white
extends is large; we speak of an action or a process as lengthy,
because the time covered is long; these things cannot in their
own right claim the quantitative epithet. For instance, should
any one explain how long an action was, his statement would be
made in terms of the time taken, to the effect that it lasted a
year, or something of that sort. In the same way, he would
explain the size of a white object in terms of surface, for he
would state the area which it covered. Thus the things already
mentioned, and these alone, are in their intrinsic nature
quantities; nothing else can claim the name in its own right,
but, if at all, only in a secondary sense.

Quantities have no contraries. In the case of definite quantities
this is obvious; thus, there is nothing that is the contrary of
'two cubits long' or of 'three cubits long', or of a surface, or
of any such quantities. A man might, indeed, argue that 'much'
was the contrary of 'little', and 'great' of 'small'. But these
are not quantitative, but relative; things are not great or small
absolutely, they are so called rather as the result of an act of
comparison. For instance, a mountain is called small, a grain
large, in virtue of the fact that the latter is greater than
others of its kind, the former less. Thus there is a reference
here to an external standard, for if the terms 'great' and
'small' were used absolutely, a mountain would never be called
small or a grain large. Again, we say that there are many people
in a village, and few in Athens, although those in the city are
many times as numerous as those in the village: or we say that a
house has many in it, and a theatre few, though those in the