whole, as in a subject, should not make us apprehensive lest we
should have to admit that such parts are not substances: for in
explaining the phrase 'being present in a subject', we stated'
that we meant 'otherwise than as parts in a whole'.

It is the mark of substances and of differentiae that, in all
propositions of which they form the predicate, they are
predicated univocally. For all such propositions have for their
subject either the individual or the species. It is true that,
inasmuch as primary substance is not predicable of anything, it
can never form the predicate of any proposition. But of secondary
substances, the species is predicated of the individual, the
genus both of the species and of the individual. Similarly the
differentiae are predicated of the species and of the
individuals. Moreover, the definition of the species and that of
the genus are applicable to the primary substance, and that of
the genus to the species. For all that is predicated of the
predicate will be predicated also of the subject. Similarly, the
definition of the differentiae will be applicable to the species
and to the individuals. But it was stated above that the word
'univocal' was applied to those things which had both name and
definition in common. It is, therefore, established that in every
proposition, of which either substance or a differentia forms the
predicate, these are predicated univocally.

All substance appears to signify that which is individual. In the
case of primary substance this is indisputably true, for the
thing is a unit. In the case of secondary substances, when we
speak, for instance, of 'man' or 'animal', our form of speech
gives the impression that we are here also indicating that which