reduction to lower terms. If the known present state of things is
such that the act done will very certainly cause death, and the
probability is a matter of common knowledge, one who does the
act, [54] knowing the present state of things, is guilty of
murder, and the law will not inquire whether he did actually
foresee the consequences or not. The test of foresight is not
what this very criminal foresaw, but what a man of reasonable
prudence would have foreseen.

On the other hand, there must be actual present knowledge of the
present facts which make an act dangerous. The act is not enough
by itself. An act, it is true, imports intention in a certain
sense. It is a muscular contraction, and something more. A spasm
is not an act. The contraction of the muscles must be willed. And
as an adult who is master of himself foresees with mysterious
accuracy the outward adjustment which will follow his inward
effort, that adjustment may be said to be intended. But the
intent necessarily accompanying the act ends there. Nothing would
follow from the act except for the environment. All acts, taken
apart from their surrounding circumstances, are indifferent to
the law. For instance, to crook the forefinger with a certain
force is the same act whether the trigger of a pistol is next to
it or not. It is only the surrounding circumstances of a pistol
loaded and cocked, and of a human being in such relation to it,
as to be manifestly likely to be hit, that make the act a wrong.
Hence, it is no sufficient foundation for liability, on any sound
principle, that the proximate cause of loss was an act.

The reason for requiring an act is, that an act implies a choice,
and that it is felt to be impolitic and unjust to make a man