of oppressing them. To such a state had the practice of war been
brought by the sort of soldiery then on foot, that the victor and the
vanquished, when desirous of their services, alike needed fresh supplies
of money; for the one had to re-equip them, and the other to bribe
them; the vanquished could not fight without being remounted, and the
conquerors would not take the field without a new gratuity. Hence it
followed, that the one derived little advantage from the victory, and
the other was the less injured by defeat; for the routed party had to be
re-equipped, and the victorious could not pursue his advantage.

From this disorderly and perverse method of procedure, it arose, that
before Niccolo's defeat became known throughout Italy, he had again
reorganized his forces, and harassed the enemy with greater vigor than
before. Hence, also, it happened, that after his disaster at Tenna, he
so soon occupied Verona: that being deprived of his army at Verona, he
was shortly able to appear with a large force in Tuscany; that being
completely defeated at Anghiari, before he reached Tuscany, he was more
powerful in the field than ever. He was thus enabled to give the duke of
Milan hopes of defending Lombardy, which by his absence appeared to
be lost; for while Niccolo spread consternation throughout Tuscany,
disasters in the former province so alarmed the duke, that he was afraid
his utter ruin would ensue before Niccolo, whom he had recalled, could
come to his relief, and check the impetuous progress of the count. Under
these impressions, the duke, to insure by policy that success which he
could not command by arms, had recourse to remedies, which on similar
occasions had frequently served his turn. He sent Niccolo da Esti,
prince of Ferrara, to the count who was then at Peschiera, to persuade
him, "That this war was not to his advantage; for if the duke became
so ruined as to be unable to maintain his position among the states of
Italy, the count would be the first to suffer; for he would cease to be