of government of course reverted to the landed proprietors and the
clergy. Animated by a just sense of this right, the Maltese had
risen of their own accord, had contended for it in defiance of death
and danger, had fought bravely, and endured patiently. Without
undervaluing the military assistance afterwards furnished by Great
Britain (though how scanty this was before the arrival of General
Pigot is well known), it remains undeniable, that the Maltese had
taken the greatest share both in the fatigues and in the privations
consequent on the siege; and that had not the greatest virtues and
the most exemplary fidelity been uniformly displayed by them, the
English troops (they not being more numerous than they had been for
the greater part of the two years) could not possibly have remained
before the fortifications of Valetta, defended as that city was by a
French garrison that greatly outnumbered the British besiegers.
Still less could there have been the least hope of ultimate success;
as if any part of the Maltese peasantry had been friendly to the
French, or even indifferent, if they had not all indeed been most
zealous and persevering in their hostility towards them, it would
have been impracticable so to blockade that island as to have
precluded the arrival of supplies. If the siege had proved
unsuccessful, the Maltese were well aware that they should be exposed
to all the horrors which revenge and wounded pride could dictate to
an unprincipled, rapacious, and sanguinary soldiery; and now that
success has crowned their efforts, is this to be their reward, that
their own allies are to bargain for them with the French as for a
herd of slaves, whom the French had before purchased from a former
proprietor? If it be urged, that there is no established government
in Malta, is it not equally true that through the whole population of
the island there is not a single dissentient? and thus that the chief
inconvenience which an established authority is to obviate is