much further than I had designed, that I must once more request my
reader to excuse me. It was to be expected (I have said) that Lord
Nelson would appreciate the isle of Malta from its relations to the
British fleet on the Mediterranean station. It was the fashion of
the day to style Egypt the key of India, and Malta the key of Egypt.
Nelson saw the hollowness of this metaphor; or if he only doubted its
applicability in the former instance, he was sure that it was false
in the latter. Egypt might or might not be the key of India, but
Malta was certainly not the key of Egypt. It was not intended to
keep constantly two distinct fleets in that sea; and the largest
naval force at Malta would not supersede the necessity of a squadron
off Toulon. Malta does not lie in the direct course from Toulon to
Alexandria; and from the nature of the winds (taking one time with
another) the comparative length of the voyage to the latter port will
be found far less than a view of the map would suggest, and in truth
of little practical importance. If it were the object of the French
fleet to avoid Malta in its passage to Egypt, the port-admiral at
Valetta would in all probability receive his first intelligence of
its course from Minorca or the squadron off Toulon, instead of
communicating it. In what regards the refitting and provisioning of
the fleet, either on ordinary or extraordinary occasions, Malta was
as inconvenient as Minorca was advantageous, not only from its
distance (which yet was sufficient to render it almost useless in
cases of the most pressing necessity, as after a severe action or
injuries of tempest), but likewise from the extreme difficulty, if
not impracticability of leaving the harbour of Valetta with a NW.
wind, which often lasts for weeks together. In all these points his
lordship's observations were perfectly just; and it must be conceded
by all persons acquainted with the situation and circumstances of
Malta, that its importance, as a British possession, if not