considerations. It had been long his conviction that the
Mediterranean squadron should be supplied by regular store-ships, the
sole business of which should be that of carriers for the fleet.
This he recommended as by far the most economic plan in the first
instance. Secondly, beyond any other it would secure a system and
regularity in the arrival of supplies. And, lastly, it would conduce
to the discipline of the navy, and prevent both ships and officers
from being out of the way on any sudden emergency. If this system
were introduced, the objections to Malta, from its great distance,
&c., would have little force. On the other hand, the objections to
Minorca he deemed irremovable. The same disadvantages which attended
the getting out of the harbour of Valetta, applied to vessels getting
into Port Mahon; but while fifteen hundred or two thousand British
troops might be safely entrusted with the preservation of Malta, the
troops for the defence of Minorca must ever be in proportion to those
which the enemy may be supposed likely to send against it. It is so
little favoured by nature or by art, that the possessors stood merely
on the level with the invaders. Caeteris paribus, if there 12,000 of
the enemy landed, there must be an equal number to repel them; nor
could the garrison, or any part of it, be spared for any sudden
emergency without risk of losing the island. Previously to the
battle of Marengo, the most earnest representations were made to the
governor and commander at Minorca by the British admiral, who offered
to take on himself the whole responsibility of the measure, if he
would permit the troops at Minorca to join our allies. The governor
felt himself compelled to refuse his assent. Doubtless, he acted
wisely, for responsibility is not transferable. The fact is
introduced in proof of the defenceless state of Minorca, and its
constant liability to attack. If the Austrian army had stood in the
same relation to eight or nine thousand British soldiers at Malta, a