SYNTHESIS of the individual will and the common reason, by the
subordination of the former to the latter, the only possible likeness
or image of the PROTHESIS or identity, and therefore the required
proper character of man. Conscience, then, is a witness respecting
the identity of the will and the reason, effected by the self-
subordination of the will or self to the reason, as equal to or
representing the will of God. But the personal will is a factor in
other moral SYNTHESIS, for example, appetite PLUS personal will =
sensuality; lust of power, PLUS personal will = ambition, and so on,
equally as in the SYNTHESIS on which the conscience is grounded. Not
this, therefore, but the other SYNTHESIS, must supply the specific
character of the conscience, and we must enter into an analysis of
reason. Such as the nature and objects of the reason are, such must
be the functions and objects of the conscience. And the former we
shall best learn by recapitulating those constituents of the total
man which are either contrary to or disparate from the reason.

I. Reason, and the proper objects of reason, are wholly alien from
sensation. Reason is supersensual, and its antagonist is appetite,
and the objects of appetite the lust of the flesh.

II. Reason and its objects do not appertain to the world of the
senses, inward or outward; that is, they partake not of sense or
fancy. Reason is supersensuous, and here its antagonist is the lust
of the eye.

III. Reason and its objects are not things of reflection,
association, discursion, discourse in the old sense of the word as
opposed to intuition; "discursive or intuitive," as Milton has it.
Reason does not indeed necessarily exclude the finite, either in time