It is evident, then, that the reason as the irradiative power, and
the representative of the infinite, judges the understanding as the
faculty of the finite, and cannot without error be judged by it.
When this is attempted, or when the understanding in its SYNTHESIS
with the personal will, usurps the supremacy of the reason, or
affects to supersede the reason, it is then what St. Paul calls the
mind of the flesh ([Greek text]), or the wisdom of this world. The
result is, that the reason is superfinite; and in this relation, its
antagonist is the insubordinate understanding, or mind of the flesh.

IV. Reason, as one with the absolute will (IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE
LOGOS, AND THE LOGOS WAS WITH GOD, AND THE LOGOS WAS GOD), and
therefore for man the certain representative of the will of God, is
above the will of man as an individual will. We have seen in III.
that it stands in antagonism to all mere particulars; but here it
stands in antagonism to all mere individual interests as so many
selves, to the personal will as seeking its objects in the
manifestation of itself for itself--sit pro ratione voluntas;--
whether this be realised with adjuncts, as in the lust of the flesh,
and in the lust of the eye; or without adjuncts, as in the thirst and
pride of power, despotism, egoistic ambition. The fourth antagonist,
then, of reason, is the lust of the will.

Corollary. Unlike a million of tigers, a million of men is very
different from a million times one man. Each man in a numerous
society is not only coexistent with, but virtually organised into,
the multitude of which he is an integral part. His idem is modified
by the alter. And there arise impulses and objects from this
SYNTHESIS of the alter et idem, myself and my neighbour. This,