kings of the House of Stuart had been regarded by every party in
the state with strong and not unreasonable aversion. The common
law gave the Sovereign no power to control his troops. The
Parliament, regarding them as mere tools of tyranny, had not been
disposed to give such power by statute. James indeed had induced
his corrupt and servile judges to put on some obsolete laws a
construction which enabled him to punish desertion capitally. But
this construction was considered by all respectable jurists as
unsound, and, had it been sound, would have been far from
effecting all that was necessary for the purpose of maintaining
military discipline. Even James did not venture to inflict death
by sentence of a court martial. The deserter was treated as an
ordinary felon, was tried at the assizes by a petty jury on a
bill found by a grand jury, and was at liberty to avail himself
of any technical flaw which might be discovered in the
indictment.

The Revolution, by altering the relative position of the prince
and the parliament, had altered also the relative position of the
army and the nation. The King and the Commons were now at unity;
and both were alike menaced by the greatest military power which
had existed in Europe since the downfall of the Roman empire. In
a few weeks thirty thousand veterans, accustomed to conquer, and
led by able and experienced captains, might cross from the ports
of Normandy and Brittany to our shores. That such a force would
with little difficulty scatter three times that number of
militia, no man well acquainted with war could doubt. There must
then be regular soldiers; and, if there were to be regular
soldiers, it must be indispensable, both to their efficiency, and
to the security of every other class, that they should be kept