have censured the manner in which the negotiations of that time
were conducted are scarcely consistent with themselves. For, while
they blame William for being his own Ambassador Plenipotentiary at
the Hague, they praise him for being his own Commander in Chief in
Ireland. Yet where is the distinction in principle between the two
cases? Surely every reason which can be brought to prove that he
violated the constitution, when, by his own sole authority, he
made compacts with the Emperor and the Elector of Brandenburg,
will equally prove that he violated the constitution, when, by his
own sole authority, he ordered one column to plunge into the water
at Oldbridge and another to cross the bridge of Slane. If the
constitution gave him the command of the forces of the State, the
constitution gave him also the direction of the foreign relations
of the State. On what principle then can it be maintained that he
was at liberty to exercise the former power without consulting any
body, but that he was bound to exercise the latter power in
conformity with the advice of a minister? Will it be said that an
error in diplomacy is likely to be more injurious to the country
than an error in strategy? Surely not. It is hardly conceivable
that any blunder which William might have made at the Hague could
have been more injurious to the public interests than a defeat at
the Boyne. Or will it be said that there was greater reason for
placing confidence in his military than in his diplomatic skill?
Surely not. In war he showed some great moral and intellectual
qualities; but, as a tactician, he did not rank high; and of his
many campaigns only two were decidedly successful. In the talents
of a negotiator, on the other hand, he has never been surpassed.
Of the interests and the tempers of the continental courts he knew
more than all his Privy Council together. Some of his ministers
were doubtless men of great ability, excellent orators in the