the leading Whig statesmen was communicated to the King in a
letter which was not many months later placed on the records of
Parliament. These statesmen entirely agreed with William in
wishing to see the question of the Spanish succession speedily
and peaceably settled. They apprehended that, if Charles should
die leaving that question unsettled, the immense power of the
French King and the geographical situation of his dominions would
enable him to take immediate possession of the most important
parts of the great inheritance. Whether he was likely to venture
on so bold a course, and whether, if he did venture on it, any
continental government would have the means and the spirit to
withstand him, were questions as to which the English ministers,
with unfeigned deference, submitted their opinion to that of
their master, whose knowledge of the interests and tempers of all
the courts of Europe was unrivalled. But there was one important
point which must not be left out of consideration, and about
which his servants might perhaps be better informed than himself,
the temper of their own country. It was, the Chancellor wrote,
their duty to tell His Majesty that the recent elections had
indicated the public feeling in a manner which had not been
expected, but which could not be mistaken. The spirit which had
borne the nation up through nine years of exertions and
sacrifices seemed to be dead. The people were sick of taxes; they
hated the thought of war. As it would, in such circumstances, be
no easy matter to form a coalition capable of resisting the
pretensions of France, it was most desirable that she should be
induced to withdraw those pretensions; and it was not to be
expected that she would withdraw them without securing for
herself a large compensation. The principle of the Treaty of Loo,
therefore, the English Ministers cordially approved. But whether