with England and the United Provinces; and it is almost certain
that, if France had kept faith, the treaty would have been
carried into effect without any serious opposition in any
quarter. The Emperor might have complained and threatened; but he
must have submitted; for what could he do? He had no fleet; and
it was therefore impossible for him even to attempt to possess
himself of Castile, of Arragon, of Sicily, of the Indies, in
opposition to the united navies of the three greatest maritime
powers in the world. In fact, the only part of the Spanish empire
which he could hope to seize and hold by force against the will
of the confederates of Loo was the Milanese; and the Milanese the
confederates of Loo had agreed to assign to his family. He would
scarcely have been so mad as to disturb the peace of the world
when the only thing which he had any chance of gaining by war was
offered him without war. The Castilians would doubtless have
resented the dismemberment of the unwieldy body of which they
formed the head. But they would have perceived that by resisting
they were much more likely to lose the Indies than to preserve
Guipuscoa. As to Italy, they could no more make war there than in
the moon. Thus the crisis which had seemed likely to produce an
European war of ten years would have produced nothing worse than
a few angry notes and plaintive manifestoes.

Both the confederate Kings wished their compact to remain a
secret while their brother Charles lived; and it probably would
have remained secret, had it been confided only to the English
and French Ministers. But the institutions of the United
Provinces were not well fitted for the purpose of concealment. It
had been necessary to trust so many deputies and magistrates that
rumours of what had been passing at Loo got abroad. Quiros, the