a thousand Confederates and three thousand Federals were
captured. It was a Confederate failure; but hardly the kind of
victory the Federals needed just then, before the consummate
triumph of Farragut at New Orleans. It brought together Federal
forces that the Confederates could not possibly withstand, even
on their new line east from Memphis. But it did not raise the
Federal, or depress the Confederate, morale.


Four days after the battle Halleck arrived at Pittsburg Landing
and took command of the combined armies. He was soon reinforced
by Pope; whereupon he divided the whole into right and left
wings, center, and reserve, each under its own commander. Grant
was made second in command of the whole. But, as Halleck dealt
directly with his other immediate subordinates, Grant simply
became the fifth wheel of the Halleckian slowcoach, which, after
twenty days of preparation, began, with most elaborate
precautions, its crawl toward Corinth.

Grant's position became so nearly unbearable that he applied more
than once for transfer to some other place. But this was refused.
So he strove to do his impossible duty till the middle of July,
when his punishment for Shiloh was completed by his promotion to
command a depleted remnant of Halleck's Grand Army. It is not by
any means the least of Grant's claims to real greatness that, as
a leader, he was able to survive his most searching trials: the
surprise at Shiloh, the misunderstandings and arrest that
followed Shiloh, the slur of being made a fifth-wheel
second-in-command, the demoralizing strain of that "most anxious
period of the war" when his depleted forces were thrown back on