The region of the Gulf and lower Mississippi being now under the
assured predominance of Union forces, Grant, with equal wisdom
and decision, entirely approved of Sherman's plan to cut loose
from his western base, make a devastating march through the heart
of fertile Georgia, and join the eastern forces of the North at
Savannah, where Fort Pulaski was in Union hands and the Union
navy was, as usual, overwhelmingly strong.

Sherman's March to the Sea at once acquired a popular renown
which it has never lost. This, however, was chiefly because it
happened to catch the public eye while nothing else was on the
stage. For its many admirable features were those about which
most people know little and care less: well-combined grand
strategy, perfection in headquarter orders and the incidental
staff work, excellent march discipline, wonderful coordination
between the different arms of the Service and with all auxiliary
branches--especially the commissariat and transport, and, to
clinch everything, a thoroughness of execution which
distinguished each unit concerned. As a feat of arms this famous
march is hardly worth mentioning. There were no battles and no
such masterly maneuvers as those of the much harder march to
Atlanta. Nor was the operational problem to be mentioned in the
same breath with that of the subsequent march through the
Carolinas. Sherman himself says: "Were I to express my measure of
the relative importance of the march to the sea, and of that from
Savannah northward, I would place the former at one, and the
latter at ten--or the maximum."

The Government was very doubtful and counseled reconsideration.