must have won. But previous Governments had never given the army
the means of making proper surveys; so here, within a day's march
of the Federal capital, the maps were worthless for military use.
Information had to be gleaned by reconnaissance; and
reconnaissance takes time, especially without trustworthy guides,
sufficient cavalry, and a proper staff. Moreover, the army was
all parts and no whole, through no fault of McDowell's or of his
military chiefs. The three-month volunteers, whose term of
service was nearly over, had not learned their drill as
individuals before being herded into companies, battalions, and
brigades, of course becoming more and more inefficient as the
units grew more and more complex. Of the still more essential
discipline they naturally knew still less. There was no lack of
courage; for these were the same breed of men as those with whom
Washington had won immortal fame, the same as those with whom
both Grant and Lee were yet to win it. But, as Napoleon used to
say, mere men are not the same as soldiers. Nor are armed mobs
the same as armies.

The short march to the front was both confused and demoralizing.
No American officer had ever had the chance even of seeing, much
less handling, thirty-six thousand men under arms. This force was
followed by an immense and unwieldy train of supplies, manned by
wholly undisciplined civilian drivers; while other, and quite
superfluous, civilians clogged every movement and made confusion
worse confounded. "The march," says Sherman, who commanded a
brigade, "demonstrated little save the general laxity of
discipline; for, with all my personal efforts, I could not
prevent the men from straggling for water, blackberries, or
anything on the way they fancied." In the whole of the first long