discouragement of that day's march," said Johnston, "is
indescribable. Frequent and unreasonable delays caused so slow a
rate of marching as to make me despair of joining General
Beauregard in time to aid him." Even the First Brigade, with all
the advantages of leading the march and of having learnt the
rudiments of drill and discipline, was exhausted by a day's work
that it could have romped through later on. Jackson himself stood
guard alone till dawn while all his soldiers slept.

As Jackson's men marched down to take the train at Piedmont,
Stuart gayly trotted past, having left Patterson still in
ignorance that Johnston's force had gone. By four in the
afternoon of the nineteenth Jackson was detraining at Manassas.
But, as we shall presently see, it was nearly two whole days
before the last of Johnston's brigades arrived, just in time for
the crisis of the battle. When Johnston had joined Beauregard
their united effective total was thirty thousand men. There had
been a wastage of three thousand. McDowell also had no more than
thirty thousand effectives present on the twenty-first; for he
left one division at Centreville and lost the rest by straggling
and by the way in which the battery and battalion already
mentioned had "claimed their discharge" at Blackburn's Ford.
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth, while, sorely against
his will, the Federals were having their "monster military
picnic" at Centreville, he was reconnoitering his constantly
increasing enemy under the greatest difficulties, with his
ill-trained staff, bad maps, and lack of proper guides.

Lee had chosen six miles of Bull Run as a good defensive
position. But Beauregard intended to attack, hoping to profit by