Of course there is a reverse to all this. If the roads, rails,
and waterways are better around the circle than inside it, then
the odds may be turned the other way; and this happens most often
when the forces on the exterior lines are the better provided
with sea-power. Again, if the exterior forces are so much
stronger than the interior forces that these latter dare not
leave any strategic point open in case the enemy breaks through,
then it is evident that the interior forces will suffer all the
disadvantages of being surrounded, divided, worn out, and
defeated.

This happened at last to the South, and was one of the four
advantages she lost. Another was the hope of foreign
intervention, which died hard in Southern hearts, but which was
already moribund halfway through the war. A third was the hope of
dissension in the North, a hope which often ran high till
Lincoln's reelection in November, '64, and one which only died
out completely with the surrender of Lee. The fourth was the
unfounded belief that Southerners were the better fighting men.
They certainly had an advantage at first in having a larger
proportion of men accustomed to horses and arms and inured to
life in the open. But, other things being equal, there was
nothing to choose between the two sides, so far as natural
fighting values were concerned.

Practically all the Southern "military males" passed into the
ranks; and a military male eventually meant any one who could
march to the front or do non-combatant service with an army, from
boys in their teens to men in their sixties. Conscription came
after one year; and with very few exemptions, such as the clergy,