taking New Orleans. They were soon reinforced by this reminder:
"The only anxiety we feel is to know if you have followed up your
instructions and pushed a strong force up the river to meet the
Western flotilla." Farragut therefore felt bound to obey and do
all that could be done to carry on a quite impossible campaign.
So, with a useless landing party of only fifteen hundred troops,
he pushed up to Vicksburg, four hundred miles above New Orleans.
The nearest Federal army had been halted by the Confederate
defenses above Memphis, another four hundred higher still.

There were several reasons why Farragut should not have gone up.
His big ships would certainly be stranded if he went up and
waited for the army to come down; moreover, when stranded, these
ships would be captured while waiting, because both banks were
swarming with vastly outnumbering Confederate troops. Then, such
a disaster would more than offset the triumph of New Orleans by
still further depressing Federal morale at a time when the
Federal arms were doing none too well near Washington. Finally,
all the force that was being worse than wasted up the Mississippi
might have been turned against Mobile, which, at that time, was
much weaker than the defenses Farragut had already overcome. But
the people of the North were clamorous for more victories along
the line to which the press had drawn their gaze. So the
Government ordered the fleet to carry on this impossible
campaign.

Farragut did his best. Within a month of passing the forts he had
not only captured New Orleans and repaired the many serious
damages suffered by his fleet but had captured Baton Rouge, and
taken even his biggest ships to Vicksburg, five hundred miles