administration the government was still without a policy, either domestic
or foreign; that the slavery question should be eliminated from the
struggle about the Union; that the matter of the maintenance of the forts
and other possessions in the South should be decided with that view; that
explanations should be demanded categorically from the governments of
Spain and France, which were then preparing, one for the annexation of
San Domingo, and both for the invasion of Mexico; that if no satisfactory
explanations were received war should be declared against Spain and
France by the United States; that explanations should also be sought from
Russia and Great Britain, and a vigorous continental spirit of
independence against European intervention be aroused all over the
American continent; that this policy should be incessantly pursued and
directed by somebody; that either the President should devote himself
entirely to it, or devolve the direction on some member of his cabinet,
whereupon all debate on this policy must end.

This could be understood only as a formal demand that the President
should acknowledge his own incompetency to perform his duties, content
himself with the amusement of distributing post-offices, and resign his
power as to all important affairs into the hands of his Secretary of
State. It seems to-day incomprehensible how a statesman of Seward's
calibre could at that period conceive a plan of policy in which the
slavery question had no place; a policy which rested upon the utterly
delusive assumption that the secessionists, who had already formed their
Southern Confederacy and were with stern resolution preparing to fight
for its independence, could be hoodwinked back into the Union by some
sentimental demonstration against European interference; a policy which,
at that critical moment, would have involved the Union in a foreign war,
thus inviting foreign intervention in favor of the Southern Confederacy,
and increasing tenfold its chances in the struggle for independence. But