and safest; that a policy of heroic methods, while it has sometimes
accomplished great results, could in a democracy like ours be maintained
only by constant success; that it would have quickly broken down under
the weight of disaster; that it might have been successful from the
start, had the Union, at the beginning of the conflict, had its Grants
and Shermans and Sheridans, its Farraguts and Porters, fully matured at
the head of its forces; but that, as the great commanders had to be
evolved slowly from the developments of the war, constant success could
not be counted upon, and it was best to follow a policy which was in
friendly contact with the popular force, and therefore more fit to stand
trial of misfortune on the battlefield. But at that period they thought
differently, and their dissatisfaction with Lincoln's doings was greatly
increased by the steps he took toward the reconstruction of rebel States
then partially in possession of the Union forces.

In December, 1863, Lincoln issued an amnesty proclamation, offering
pardon to all implicated in the rebellion, with certain specified
exceptions, on condition of their taking and maintaining an oath to
support the Constitution and obey the laws of the United States and the
proclamations of the President with regard to slaves; and also promising
that when, in any of the rebel States, a number of citizens equal to one
tenth of the voters in 1860 should re-establish a state government in
conformity with the oath above mentioned, such should be recognized by
the Executive as the true government of the State. The proclamation
seemed at first to be received with general favor. But soon another
scheme of reconstruction, much more stringent in its provisions, was put
forward in the House of Representatives by Henry Winter Davis. Benjamin
Wade championed it in the Senate. It passed in the closing moments of
the session in July, 1864, and Lincoln, instead of making it a law by his
signature, embodied the text of it in a proclamation as a plan of