this rule the South could fairly contend that, inasmuch as they got one
slave State north of the line at the inception of the law, they have the
right to have another given them north of it occasionally, now and then,
in the indefinite westward extension of the line. This demonstrates the
absurdity of attempting to deduce a prospective principle from the
Missouri Compromise line.

When we voted for the Wilmot Proviso we were voting to keep slavery out
of the whole Mexican acquisition, and little did we think we were thereby
voting to let it into Nebraska lying several hundred miles distant. When
we voted against extending the Missouri line, little did we think we were
voting to destroy the old line, then of near thirty years' standing.

To argue that we thus repudiated the Missouri Compromise is no less
absurd than it would be to argue that because we have so far forborne to
acquire Cuba, we have thereby, in principle, repudiated our former
acquisitions and determined to throw them out of the Union. No less
absurd than it would be to say that because I may have refused to build
an addition to my house, I thereby have decided to destroy the existing
house! And if I catch you setting fire to my house, you will turn upon me
and say I instructed you to do it!

The most conclusive argument, however, that while for the Wilmot Proviso,
and while voting against the extension of the Missouri line, we never
thought of disturbing the original Missouri Compromise, is found in the
fact that there was then, and still is, an unorganized tract of fine
country, nearly as large as the State of Missouri, lying immediately west
of Arkansas and south of the Missouri Compromise line, and that we never
attempted to prohibit slavery as to it. I wish particular attention to
this. It adjoins the original Missouri Compromise line by its northern