resist the admission of Utah and New Mexico, even should they ask to come
in as slave States. I meant nothing about additional Territories,
because, as I understood, we then had no Territory whose character as to
slavery was not already settled. As to Nebraska, I regarded its character
as being fixed by the Missouri Compromise for thirty years--as
unalterably fixed as that of my own home in Illinois. As to new
acquisitions, I said, "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof." When
we make new acquisitions, we will, as heretofore, try to manage them
somehow. That is my answer; that is what I meant and said; and I appeal
to the people to say each for himself whether that is not also the
universal meaning of the free States.

And now, in turn, let me ask a few questions. If, by any or all these
matters, the repeal of the Missouri Compromise was commanded, why was not
the command sooner obeyed? Why was the repeal omitted in the Nebraska
Bill of 1853? Why was it omitted in the original bill of 1854? Why in the
accompanying report was such a repeal characterized as a departure from
the course pursued in 1850 and its continued omission recommended?

I am aware Judge Douglas now argues that the subsequent express repeal is
no substantial alteration of the bill. This argument seems wonderful to
me. It is as if one should argue that white and black are not different.
He admits, however, that there is a literal change in the bill, and that
he made the change in deference to other senators who would not support
the bill without. This proves that those other senators thought the
change a substantial one, and that the Judge thought their opinions worth
deferring to. His own opinions, therefore, seem not to rest on a very
firm basis, even in his own mind; and I suppose the world believes, and
will continue to believe, that precisely on the substance of that change
this whole agitation has arisen.