Those general positions are: that internal improvements ought not to be
made by the General Government--First. Because they would overwhelm the
treasury Second. Because, while their burdens would be general, their
benefits would be local and partial, involving an obnoxious inequality;
and Third. Because they would be unconstitutional. Fourth. Because the
States may do enough by the levy and collection of tonnage duties; or if
not--Fifth. That the Constitution may be amended. "Do nothing at all,
lest you do something wrong," is the sum of these positions is the sum of
this message. And this, with the exception of what is said about
constitutionality, applying as forcibly to what is said about making
improvements by State authority as by the national authority; so that we
must abandon the improvements of the country altogether, by any and every
authority, or we must resist and repudiate the doctrines of this message.
Let us attempt the latter.

The first position is, that a system of internal improvements would
overwhelm the treasury. That in such a system there is a tendency to
undue expansion, is not to be denied. Such tendency is founded in the
nature of the subject. A member of Congress will prefer voting for a bill
which contains an appropriation for his district, to voting for one which
does not; and when a bill shall be expanded till every district shall be
provided for, that it will be too greatly expanded is obvious. But is
this any more true in Congress than in a State Legislature? If a member
of Congress must have an appropriation for his district, so a member of a
Legislature must have one for his county. And if one will overwhelm the
national treasury, so the other will overwhelm the State treasury. Go
where we will, the difficulty is the same. Allow it to drive us from the
halls of Congress, and it will, just as easily, drive us from the State
Legislatures. Let us, then, grapple with it, and test its strength. Let
us, judging of the future by the past, ascertain whether there may not