question of the abolition of the slave-trade between the different
States, I can truly answer, as I have, that I am pledged to nothing about
it. It is a subject to which I have not given that mature consideration
that would make me feel authorized to state a position so as to hold
myself entirely bound by it. In other words, that question has never been
prominently enough before me to induce me to investigate whether we
really have the constitutional power to do it. I could investigate it if
I had sufficient time to bring myself to a conclusion upon that subject;
but I have not done so, and I say so frankly to you here, and to Judge
Douglas. I must say, however, that if I should be of opinion that
Congress does possess the constitutional power to abolish the slave-trade
among the different States, I should still not be in favor of the
exercise of that power, unless upon some conservative principle as I
conceive it, akin to what I have said in relation to the abolition of
slavery in the District of Columbia.

My answer as to whether I desire that slavery should be prohibited in all
the Territories of the United States is full and explicit within itself,
and cannot be made clearer by any comments of mine. So I suppose in
regard to the question whether I am opposed to the acquisition of any
more territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein, my answer is
such that I could add nothing by way of illustration, or making myself
better understood, than the answer which I have placed in writing.

Now in all this the Judge has me, and he has me on the record. I suppose
he had flattered himself that I was really entertaining one set of
opinions for one place, and another set for another place; that I was
afraid to say at one place what I uttered at another. What I am saying
here I suppose I say to a vast audience as strongly tending to
Abolitionism as any audience in the State of Illinois, and I believe I am