people; and I say its language amounts to an express provision for a
submission, and that he took the provision out. He says it was known that
the bill was silent in this particular; but I say, Judge Douglas, it was
not silent when you got it. It was vocal with the declaration, when you
got it, for a submission of the constitution to the people. And now, my
direct question to Judge Douglas is, to answer why, if he deemed the bill
silent on this point, he found it necessary to strike out those
particular harmless words. If he had found the bill silent and without
this provision, he might say what he does now. If he supposes it was
implied that the constitution would be submitted to a vote of the people,
how could these two lines so encumber the statute as to make it necessary
to strike them out? How could he infer that a submission was still
implied, after its express provision had been stricken from the bill? I
find the bill vocal with the provision, while he silenced it. He took it
out, and although he took out the other provision preventing a submission
to a vote of the people, I ask, Why did you first put it in? I ask him
whether he took the original provision out, which Trumbull alleges was in
the bill. If he admits that he did take it, I ask him what he did it for.
It looks to us as if he had altered the bill. If it looks differently to
him,--if he has a different reason for his action from the one we assign
him--he can tell it. I insist upon knowing why he made the bill silent
upon that point when it was vocal before he put his hands upon it.

I was told, before my last paragraph, that my time was within three
minutes of being out. I presume it is expired now; I therefore close.




Mr. LINCOLN'S REJOINDER.