his consideration the evidence in his own declaration, on this day, of
his becoming sectional too. I see it rapidly approaching. Whatever may be
the result of this ephemeral contest between Judge Douglas and myself, I
see the day rapidly approaching when his pill of sectionalism, which he
has been thrusting down the throats of Republicans for years past, will
be crowded down his own throat.

Now, in regard to what Judge Douglas said (in the beginning of his
speech) about the Compromise of 1850 containing the principles of the
Nebraska Bill, although I have often presented my views upon that
subject, yet as I have not done so in this canvass, I will, if you
please, detain you a little with them. I have always maintained, so far
as I was able, that there was nothing of the principle of the Nebraska
Bill in the Compromise of 1850 at all,--nothing whatever. Where can you
find the principle of the Nebraska Bill in that Compromise? If anywhere,
in the two pieces of the Compromise organizing the Territories of New
Mexico and Utah. It was expressly provided in these two acts that when
they came to be admitted into the Union they should be admitted with or
without slavery, as they should choose, by their own constitutions.
Nothing was said in either of those acts as to what was to be done in
relation to slavery during the Territorial existence of those
Territories, while Henry Clay constantly made the declaration (Judge
Douglas recognizing him as a leader) that, in his opinion, the old
Mexican laws would control that question during the Territorial
existence, and that these old Mexican laws excluded slavery. How can that
be used as a principle for declaring that during the Territorial
existence as well as at the time of framing the constitution the people,
if you please, might have slaves if they wanted them? I am not discussing
the question whether it is right or wrong; but how are the New Mexican
and Utah laws patterns for the Nebraska Bill? I maintain that the