The highest good was the virtuous life. Virtue alone is happiness,
and vice is unhappiness. Carrying this theory to its extreme,
the Stoic said that there could be no gradations between virtue
and vice, though of course each has its special manifestations.
Moreover, nothing is good but virtue, and nothing but vice is bad.
Those outside things which are commonly called good or bad,
such as health and sickness, wealth and poverty, pleasure and pain,
are to him indifferent adiofora. All these things are merely
the sphere in which virtue may act. The ideal Wise Man is
sufficient unto himself in all things, autarkhs and knowing
these truths, he will be happy even when stretched upon the rack.
It is probable that no Stoic claimed for himself that he was
this Wise Man, but that each strove after it as an ideal
much as the Christian strives after a likeness to Christ.
The exaggeration in this statement was, however, so obvious,
that the later Stoics were driven to make a further subdivision
of things indifferent into what is preferable (prohgmena) and what
is undesirable. They also held that for him who had not
attained to the perfect wisdom, certain actions were proper.
(kaqhkonta) These were neither virtuous nor vicious,
but, like the indifferent things, held a middle place.
Two points in the Stoic system deserve special mention.
One is a careful distinction between things which are in
our power and things which are not. Desire and dislike,
opinion and affection, are within the power of the will;
whereas health, wealth, honour, and other such are general1y not so.
The Stoic was called upon to control his desires and affections,
and to guide his opinion; to bring his whole being under the sway
of the will or leading principle, just as the universe is
guided and governed by divine Providence. This is a special