He therefore that willingly and wittingly doth lie,
is impious in that he doth receive, and so commit injustice:
but he that against his will, in that he disagreeth from the nature
of the universe, and in that striving with the nature of the world
he doth in his particular, violate the general order of the world.
For he doth no better than strive and war against it,
who contrary to his own nature applieth himself to that which
is contrary to truth. For nature had before furnished him
with instincts and opportunities sufficient for the attainment
of it ; which he having hitherto neglected, is not now able
to discern that which is false from that which is true.
He also that pursues after pleasures, as that which is truly
good and flies from pains, as that which is truly evil:
is impious. For such a one must of necessity oftentimes accuse
that common nature, as distributing many things both unto the evil,
and unto the good, not according to the deserts of either:
as unto the bad oftentimes pleasures, and the causes of pleasures;
so unto the good, pains, and the occasions of pains. Again, he that
feareth pains and crosses in this world, feareth some of those
things which some time or other must needs happen in the world.
And that we have already showed to be impious. And he that
pursueth after pleasures, will not spare, to compass his desires,
to do that which is unjust, and that is manifestly impious.
Now those things which unto nature are equally indifferent
(for she had not created both, both pain and pleasure,
if both had not been unto her equally indifferent):
they that will live according to nature, must in those things
(as being of the same mind and disposition that she is)
be as equally indifferent. Whosoever therefore in either matter
of pleasure and pain; death and life; honour and dishonour,