a state of half famine, wrote: "If Howe does not take advantage
of our weak state he is very unfit for his trust." Howe remained
inactive and time, thus despised, worked its due revenge. Later
Howe did move, and with skill, but he missed the rapid
combination in action which was the first condition of final
success. He could have captured Philadelphia in May. He took the
city, but not until September, when to hold it had become a
liability and not an asset. To go there at all was perhaps
unwise; to go in September was for him a tragic mistake.

From New York to Philadelphia the distance by land is about a
hundred miles. The route lay across New Jersey, that "garden of
America" which English travelers spoke of as resembling their own
highly cultivated land. Washington had his headquarters at
Morristown, in northern New Jersey. His resources were at a low
ebb. He had always the faith that a cause founded on justice
could not fail; but his letters at this time are full of
depressing anxiety. Each State regarded itself as in danger and
made care of its own interests its chief concern. By this time
Congress had lost most of the able men who had given it dignity
and authority. Like Howe it had slight sense of the value of time
and imagined that tomorrow was as good as today. Wellington once
complained that, though in supreme command, he had not authority
to appoint even a corporal. Washington was hampered both by
Congress and by the State Governments in choosing leaders. He had
some officers, such as Greene, Knox, and Benedict Arnold, whom he
trusted. Others, like Gates and Conway, were ceaseless
intriguers. To General Sullivan, who fancied himself constantly
slighted and ill-treated, Washington wrote sharply to abolish his
poisonous suspicions.