enough. About a hundred had been killed and the rest were in a
state of mutiny. Soon it was known that Benedict Arnold, with a
considerable force, was pushing up the Mohawk Valley to relieve
the American fort. Arnold knew how to deal with savages. He took
care that his friendly Indians should come into contact with
those of Brant and tell lurid tales of utter disaster to Burgoyne
and of a great avenging army on the march to attack St. Leger.
The result was that St. Leger's Indians broke out in riot and
maddened themselves with stolen rum. Disorder affected even the
soldiers. The only thing for St. Leger to do was to get away. He
abandoned his guns and stores and, harassed now by his former
Indian allies, made his way to Oswego and in the end reached
Montreal with a remnant of his force.

News of these things came to Burgoyne just after the disaster at
Bennington. Since Fort Stanwix was in a country counted upon as
Loyalist at heart it was especially discouraging again to find
that in the main the population was against the British. During
the war almost without exception Loyalist opinion proved weak
against the fierce determination of the American side. It was
partly a matter of organization. The vigilance committees in each
State made life well-nigh intolerable to suspected Tories. Above
all, however, the British had to bear the odium which attaches
always to the invader. We do not know what an American army would
have done if, with Iroquois savages as allies, it had made war in
an English county. We know what loathing a parallel situation
aroused against the British army in America. The Indians, it
should be noted, were not soldiers under British discipline but
allies; the chiefs regarded themselves as equals who must be
consulted and not as enlisted to take orders from a British