opinions, laid it down with definiteness that in construing and
applying the law recourse must be had to the "rule of reason." He
made clear the conviction of the court that it was "undue"
restraints of trade which the law forbade and not incidental or
inconsiderable ones. This definitive interpretation of the law,
while it caused considerable criticism at the moment, in ultimate
effect so cleared the air about the Sherman act as effectually to
dispose of the demands for its amendment in the direction of
greater leniency or severity.

But the proving of the anti-trust law as an effective weapon
against the flagrantly offending trusts, according to Roosevelt's
conviction, was only a part of the battle. As he said,
"monopolies can, although in rather cumbrous fashion, be broken
up by lawsuits. Great business combinations, however, cannot
possibly be made useful instead of noxious industrial agencies
merely by lawsuits, and especially by lawsuits supposed to be
carried on for their destruction and not for their control and
regulation." He took, as usual, the constructive point of view.
He saw both sides of the trust question--the inevitability and
the beneficence of combination in modern business, and the danger
to the public good that lay in the unregulated and uncontrolled
wielding of great power by private individuals. He believed that
the thing to do with great power was not to destroy it but to use
it, not to forbid its acquisition but to direct its application.
So he set himself to the task of securing fresh legislation
regarding the regulation of corporate activities.

Such legislation was not easy to get; for the forces of reaction
were strong in Congress. But several significant steps in this