occurrences of life; for, in the public administrations of justice,
mercy to one may be cruelty to others.

It is grown almost into a maxim, that good-natured men are not
always men of the most wit. This observation, in my opinion, has no
foundation in nature. The greatest wits I have conversed with are
men eminent for their humanity. I take, therefore, this remark to
have been occasioned by two reasons. First, because ill-nature
among ordinary observers passes for wit. A spiteful saying
gratifies so many little passions in those who hear it, that it
generally meets with a good reception. The laugh rises upon it, and
the man who utters it is looked upon as a shrewd satirist. This may
be one reason why a great many pleasant companions appear so
surprisingly dull when they have endeavoured to be merry in print;
the public being more just than private clubs or assemblies, in
distinguishing between what is wit and what is ill-nature.

Another reason why the good-natured man may sometimes bring his wit
in question is perhaps because he is apt to be moved with compassion
for those misfortunes or infirmities which another would turn into
ridicule, and by that means gain the reputation of a wit. The ill-
natured man, though but of equal parts, gives himself a larger field
to expatiate in; he exposes those failings in human nature which the
other would cast a veil over, laughs at vices which the other either
excuses or conceals, gives utterance to reflections which the other
stifles, falls indifferently upon friends or enemies, exposes the
person who has obliged him, and, in short, sticks at nothing that
may establish his character as a wit. It is no wonder, therefore,
he succeeds in it better than the man of humanity, as a person who
makes use of indirect methods is more likely to grow rich than the