national interest should have rooted out the foreign, so neither
dare the Venetians take in their subjects upon this balance, lest
the foreign interest should root out the national (which is that
of the 3,000 now governing), and by diffusing the commonwealth
throughout her territories, lose the advantage of her situation,
by which in great part it subsists. And such also is the
government of the Spaniard in the Indies, to which he deputes
natives of his own country, not admitting the creoles to the
government of those provinces, though descended from Spaniards.

But if a prince or a commonwealth may hold a territory that
is foreign in this, it may be asked why he may not hold one that
is native in the like manner? To which I answer, because he can
hold a foreign by a native territory, but not a native by a
foreign; and as hitherto I have shown what is not the provincial
balance, so by this answer it may appear what it is, namely, the
overbalance of a native territory to a foreign; for as one
country balances itself by the distribution of property according
to the proportion of the same, so one country overbalances
another by advantage of divers kinds. For example, the
Commonwealth of Rome overbalanced her provinces by the vigor of a
more excellent government opposed to a crazier. Or by a more
exquisite militia opposed to one inferior in courage or
discipline. The like was that of the Mamelukes, being a hardy
people, to the Egyptians, that were a soft one. And the balance
of situation is in this kind of wonderful effect; seeing the King
of Denmark, being none of the most potent princes, is able at the
Sound to take toll of the greatest; and as this King, by the
advantage of the land, can make the sea tributary, so Venice, by
the advantage of the sea, in whose arms she is impregnable, can