reason be nothing else but interest, and the interest of mankind
be the right interest, then the reason of mankind must be right
reason. Now compute well; for if the interest of popular
government come the nearest to the interest of mankind, then the
reason of popular government must come the nearest to right
reason.

But it may be said that the difficulty remains yet; for be
the interest of popular government right reason, a man does not
look upon reason as it is right or wrong in itself, but as it
makes for him or against him. Wherefore, unless you can show such
orders of a government as, like those of God in nature, shall be
able to constrain this or that creature to shake off that
inclination which is more peculiar to it, and take up that which
regards the common good or interest, all this is to no more end
than to persuade every man in a popular government not to carve
himself of that which he desires most, but to be mannerly at the
public table, and give the best from himself to decency and the
common interest. But that such orders may be established as may,
nay must, give the upper hand in all cases to common right or
interest, notwithstanding the nearness of that which sticks to
every man in private, and this in a way of equal certainty and
facility, is known even to girls, being no other than those that
are of common practice with them in divers cases. For example,
two of them have a cake yet undivided, which was given between
them: that each of them therefore might have that which is due,
"Divide," says one to the other, "and I will choose; or let me
divide, and you shall choose." If this be but once agreed upon,
it is enough; for the divident, dividing unequally, loses, in
regard that the other takes the better half. Wherefore she