sinking down between the King and the commons, showed that
Crassus was dead and the isthmus broken. But a monarchy, divested
of its nobility, has no refuge under heaven but an army.
Wherefore the dissolution of this government caused the war, not
the war the dissolution of this government.

Of the King's success with his arms it is not necessary to
give any further account than that they proved as ineffectual as
his nobility; but without a nobility or an army (as has been
shown) there can be no monarchy. Wherefore what is there in
nature that can arise out of these ashes but a popular
government, or a new monarchy to be erected by the victorious
army?

To erect a monarchy, be it never so new, unless like
Leviathan you can hang it, as the country-fellow speaks, by
geometry (for what else is it to say, that every other man must
give up his will to the will of this one man without any other
foundation?), it must stand upon old principles -- that is, upon
a nobility or an army planted on a due balance of dominion. Aut
viam inveniam aut faciam, was an adage of Caesar, and there is no
standing for a monarchy unless it finds this balance, or makes
it. If it finds it, the work is done to its hand; for, where
there is inequality of estates, there must be inequality of
power; and where there is inequality of power, there can be no
commonwealth. To make it, the sword must extirpate out of
dominion all other roots of power, and plant an army upon that
ground. An army may be planted nationally or provincially. To
plant it nationally, it must be in one of the four ways
mentioned, that is, either monarchically in part, as the Roman