3. Now, as far as I am concerned (I speak to both of you now),
believe me the case stands thus. If I were to say that I am not
affected by regret for Scipio, I must leave the philosophers to
justify my conduct, but in point of fact I should be telling a lie.
Affected of course I am by the loss of a friend as I think there will
never be again, such as I can fearlessly say there never was before.
But I stand in no need of medicine. I can find my own consolation,
and it consists chiefly in my being free from the mistaken notion
which generally causes pain at the departure of friends. To Scipio I
am convinced no evil has befallen mine is the disaster, if disaster
there be; and to be severely distressed at one's own misfortunes
does not show that you love your friend, but that you love yourself.

As for him, who can say that all is not more than well? For, unless
he had taken the fancy to wish for immortality, the last thing of
which he ever thought, what is there for which mortal man may
wish that he did not attain? In his early manhood he more than
justified by extraordinary personal courage the hopes which his
fellow-citizens had conceived of him as a child. He never was a
candidate for the consulship, yet was elected consul twice: the first
time before the legal age; the second at a time which, as far as he
was concerned, was soon enough, but was near being too late for
the interests of the State. By the overthrow of two cities which
were the most bitter enemies of our Empire, he put an end not only
to the wars then raging, but also to the possibility of others in the
future. What need to mention the exquisite grace of his manners,
his dutiful devotion to his mother, his generosity to his sisters, his
liberality to his relations, the integrity of his conduct to every one?
You know all this already. Finally, the estimation in which his