position there was far from strong. Upon the expiration of their
term of enlistment most of his men had gone back to Kentucky or
Virginia, and their places had been taken mainly by creoles,
whose steadfastness was doubtful. Furthermore, the Indians were
restless, and it was only by much vigilance and bravado that they
were kept in a respectful mood. All this was well known to
Hamilton, who now proposed to follow up the recapture of the
Mississippi posts by the obliteration of all traces of American
authority west of the Alleghanies.

The difficulties and dangers of a midwinter campaign in the
flooded Illinois country were not to be lightly regarded, and
weeks of contending with icy blasts and drenching rains lent a
seat by an open fire unusual attractiveness. Hence the completion
of the campaign was postponed until spring--a decision which
proved the salvation of the American cause in the West. As means
of subsistence were slender, most of the Detroit militia were
sent home, and the Indians were allowed to scatter to their
distant wigwams. The force kept at the post numbered only about
eighty or ninety whites, with a few Indians.

Clark now had at Kaskaskia a band of slightly over a hundred men.
He understood Hamilton's army to number five or six hundred. The
outlook was dubious, until Francois Vigo, a friendly Spanish
trader of St. Louis, escaping captivity at Vincennes, came to
Kaskaskia with the information that Hamilton had sent away most
of his troops; and this welcome news gave the doughty Kentuckian
a brilliant idea. He would defend his post by attacking the
invaders while they were yet at Vincennes, and before they were
ready to resume operations. "The case is desperate," he wrote to