or excites any interest in the mighty scene is _what has been_![2]

***

Neither in itself, then, nor as a subject of general contemplation, has
the future any advantage over the past. But with respect to our grosser
passions and pursuits it has. As far as regards the appeal to the
understanding or the imagination, the past is just as good, as real, of
as much intrinsic and ostensible value as the future; but there is
another principle in the human mind, the principle of action or will;
and of this the past has no hold, the future engrosses it entirely to
itself. It is this strong lever of the affections that gives so
powerful a bias to our sentiments on this subject, and violently
transposes the natural order of our associations. We regret the
pleasures we have lost, and eagerly anticipate those which are to come:
we dwell with satisfaction on the evils from which we have escaped
(_Posthaec meminisse iuvabit_)--and dread future pain. The good that is
past is in this sense like money that is spent, which is of no further
use, and about which we give ourselves little concern. The good we
expect is like a store yet untouched, and in the enjoyment of which we
promise ourselves infinite gratification. What has happened to us we
think of no consequence: what is to happen to us, of the greatest. Why
so? Simply because the one is still in our power, and the other
not--because the efforts of the will to bring any object to pass or to
prevent it strengthen our attachment or aversion to that object--because
the pains and attention bestowed upon anything add to our interest in
it--and because the habitual and earnest pursuit of any end redoubles
the ardour of our expectations, and converts the speculative and
indolent satisfaction we might otherwise feel in it into real passion.
Our regrets, anxiety, and wishes are thrown away upon the past; but the