different cases of the association of ideas. But it does not follow
that the dumb and silent pleading of the former (though sometimes, nay
often, mistaken) is less true than that of its babbling interpreter, or
that we are never to trust its dictates without consulting the express
authority of reason. Both are imperfect, both are useful in their way,
and therefore both are best together, to correct or to confirm one
another. It does not appear that in the singular instance above
mentioned, the sudden impression on the mind was superstition or fancy,
though it might have been thought so, had it not been proved by the
event to have a real physical and moral cause. Had not the same face
returned again, the doubt would never have been properly cleared up, but
would have remained a puzzle ever after, or perhaps have been soon
forgot.--By the law of association as laid down by physiologists, any
impression in a series can recall any other impression in that series
without going through the whole in order; so that the mind drops the
intermediate links, and passes on rapidly and by stealth to the more
striking effects of pleasure or pain which have naturally taken the
strongest hold of it. By doing this habitually and skillfully with
respect to the various impressions and circumstances with which our
experience makes us acquainted, it forms a series of unpremeditated
conclusions on almost all subjects that can be brought before it, as
just as they are of ready application to human life; and common sense is
the name of this body of unassuming but practical wisdom. Common sense,
however, is an impartial, instinctive result of truth and nature, and
will therefore bear the test and abide the scrutiny of the most severe
and patient reasoning. It is indeed incomplete without it. By
ingrafting reason on feeling, we 'make assurance double sure.'

'Tis the last key-stone that makes up the arch...
Then stands it a triumphal mark! Then men